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Einstein’s 1935 derivation of mass—energy equivalence is philosophically impor
tant because it contains both a criticism of purported demonstrations that proceed
by analogy and strong motivations for the deﬁnitions of the ‘new’ dynamical
quantities (viz relativistic momentum, relativistic kinetic energy and relativistic
energy). In this paper, I argue that Einstein’s criticism and insights are still relevant
today by showing how his derivation goes beyond Friedman’s demonstration of
this result in his Foundations of Spacetime ¹heories. Along the way, I isolate three
distinct physical claims associated with Einstein’s famous equation that are some
times not clearly distinguished in philosophical discussions of spacetime theory.

1. Introduction
Discussions of the equivalence of mass and energy by historians and philo
sophers of science seldom include Einstein’s ‘Elementary Derivation of the
Equivalence of Mass and Energy’ of 1935 (Einstein, 1935). Yet this paper is of
great philosophical interest because it contains criticisms of purported deriva
tions which are still relevant today. Also, rather than introducing the expres
sions for the ‘new’ relativistic dynamical quantities, such as relativistic
momentum and relativistic kinetic energy, by analogy with their Newtonian
counterparts, Einstein shows that stronger motivations can be oﬀered. To
establish these claims, I begin, in Section 2, with a brief overview Einstein’s ﬁrst
(1905b) derivation by drawing on the work of Stachel and Torretti (1982). My
purpose is to reiterate the point that this derivation is not fallacious—‘purely
dynamical’ derivations of mass—energy equivalence were not proposed as cor
rections to Einstein’s (1905b). Instead, in Einstein’s case, his 1935 derivation is
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motivated by the desire, often expressed by physicists, to ﬁnd a derivation of
mass—energy equivalence that in no way appeals to Maxwell’s theory of electro
magnetism. In Section 3, I outline Einstein’s concerns with derivations that
identify the expressions for the relativistic dynamical quantities by analogy with
their Newtonian counterparts. Along the way, I show that Einstein is implicitly
separating three physical claims associated with E"mc� which are not always
clearly distinguished.� All of this is of current interest because Einstein’s criti
cisms apply to modern derivations of mass—energy equivalence found in philo
sophical discussions of spacetime theory. In particular, I show in Section 4 that
the derivation of E"mc� found in Friedman’s Foundations of Spacetime ¹he
ories is subject to Einstein’s criticisms. Finally, in Section 5, I show, through
a detailed analysis of his 1935 derivation, how Einstein arrives at the deﬁnitions
of relativistic momentum and relativistic kinetic energy by assuming only the
most general form of the mathematical expressions for these quantities and
imposing theoretical and methodological constraints.
2. Preliminaries
Einstein ﬁrst gave a demonstration of the equivalence of mass—energy in his
(1905b) paper ‘Does the Inertia of a Body Depend upon its Energy Content’. In
this well-known argument, Einstein analyses a thought experiment that consists
of a particle emitting two equally energetic pulses of light in opposite directions.
Using the transformation equations for the components of the electromagnetic
ﬁeld and for the intensity of the pulse of light which he derived in (1905a),
Einstein arrives at his result: ‘the mass of a body is a measure of its energycontent; if the energy changes by ¸, the mass changes in the same sense by
¸/9�10��, the energy being measured in ergs, and the mass in grammes’
(Einstein, 1905b, p. 71).
For some time, a group of historians and philosophers of science regarded
Einstein’s argument as fallacious. For example, in ¹he Concept of Mass, Jammer
says:
It is a curious incident in the history of scientiﬁc thought that Einstein’s own
derivation of the formula E"mc� [2] was but the result of a petitio principii, the
conclusion begging the question (Jammer in Stachel and Torretti, 1982, p. 760).

Jammer reaches this conclusion because he believes the only way to justify a step
in Einstein’s derivation is to assume both the expression for the kinetic energy of
a particle and the relation between the change in mass of the emitting body and
the energy emitted by the body, viz m !m "¸, where m and m represent the
�
�
�
�
mass of the body before and after the act of emission. If Einstein had indeed
made these assumptions, he would be guilty of begging the question. Recently,
however, Stachel and Torretti (1982) have shown convincingly that Einstein’s
� A notable exception to this approach, which is similar to Einstein’s (1935) argument, is Feynman
et al. (1963, pp. 16-6—16-10).

original derivation contains no such fallacy.� Stachel and Torretti observe that
while it is true that Einstein derived the expression for the kinetic energy of an
‘electron’, i.e. a structureless particle with a net charge, in his earlier (1905a)
paper introducing special relativity (SR), he nowhere uses this result in his
(1905b) derivation. They correctly advise the reader to ‘note how carefully
Einstein avoids any assumption about how the relativistic energy depends on
the velocity, mass or any other parameters of the body’s internal state’ (1982,
p. 761). Stachel and Torretti then show that Einstein’s critics have overlooked
two key ‘moves’ available to Einstein. First, one can always switch from the
passive to the active interpretation of the Lorentz transformations. Second, one
can deﬁne the inertial mass of a body using the Newtonian limit. And these
‘moves’ are suﬃcient to complete a sound demonstration.
Despite the demonstrated cogency of the argument, however, as physicists
often remark, Einstein’s original derivation is undesirable because it appeals to
Maxwell’s theory. Einstein himself held this view. In the introduction to his
(1935) derivation of mass—energy equivalence, he points out that although SR
grew out of Maxwell’s electromagnetic equations, SR itself is independent of
Maxwell’s theory. Einstein wants to show that the results of SR, of which he
considered E"mc� to be the most signiﬁcant, are likewise independent of
Maxwell’s theory. For Einstein, this becomes particularly important when one
faces the possibility that energy is quantised, i.e. when we realise that ‘we do not
know the extent to which the energy concepts of the Maxwell theory can be
maintained in the face of the data of molecular physics’ (1935, p. 223). Thus, the
goal is to ﬁnd a derivation of the equivalence of mass and energy that depends
only on the physical principles that lie at the core of SR.
3. Einstein and Derivations that Proceed by Analogy
Einstein’s ‘Elementary Derivation of the Equivalence of Mass and Energy’
begins by asking us to consider the following ‘derivation’ of the equivalence of
mass and energy. Suppose a point particle of mass m travels with velocity
u"(u , u , u ) with respect to some coordinate system S adapted to an inertial
� � �
frame F. We can deﬁne the four-velocity of this particle, using
�(u)"1/(1!u�)��� to represent the Lorentz factor (with c"1), as the fourvector with components (in this coordinate system):
U"�(u) (1, u , u , u )"�(u) (1, u).
(1)
� � �
Hereafter I denote �(u) by �, when the parameter is obvious from the context.
One can then obtain a vector ‘connected’ with the motion of the particle by
multiplying U times the mass m of the particle:
X"mU"(m�, m�u).

(2)

� As with all demonstrations of mass—energy equivalence, Einstein assumes that all of the mass of
a body can be converted into energy.

Using the familiar binomial expansion for �, and neglecting terms of the third
order and higher in the velocity, we obtain the following expression for the
components of this vector:
XA"(m#� mu�, mu , mu , mu ).
�
�
�
�

(3)

In this approximation, the spatial components of the four-vector XA are equal to
the classical expression for the momentum of the particle while the temporal
component is equivalent to the classical expression of the kinetic energy plus an
additive constant m. Going back to the exact expression of the vector deﬁned by
(2), it seems natural, Einstein observes, to take the spatial components of XA as
the relativistic three-momentum and to take the temporal component minus
m as the relativistic kinetic energy and thus deﬁne:
and

p "m�u


(4)

KE "m(�!1).


(5)

Einstein now asks: how is one to interpret the temporal component m� of the
original vector X, ‘the expression of which after all is the really signiﬁcant one?’
(1935, p. 224). It seems reasonable to interpret this component as an energy term
since it is the non-constant term in the deﬁnition of KE . We can then deﬁne

the relativistic energy of the particle as
E "m�.


(6)

Furthermore, from this deﬁnition of E we see that when the velocity is zero,

there is an energy m associated with the body. We now ascribe this rest-energy
m (equal to mc� when we factor in the speed of light) to the particle and conclude
that the rest-mass of a body and its rest-energy are equivalent. So have we given
a proof of the equivalence of mass and energy?
Einstein argues that there are two reasons why the answer to this question is
no. First he says:
Of course, this derivation cannot pretend to be a proof since in no way is it shown
that this impulse satisﬁes the impulse principle and this energy the energy-principle
if several particles of the same kind interact with one another; it may be a priori
conceivable that in these conservation-principles diﬀerent expressions of the velo
city are involved (1935, p. 224).

Einstein is suggesting that we have no grounds to suppose that the quantities
m�u, m(�!1) and m� should be interpreted respectively as the relativistic
momentum, relativistic kinetic energy, and relativistic energy of the particle.
Before we can adopt such an interpretation, we must show that these quantities
satisfy their respective conservation laws. So, for example, in the theoretical
analysis of perfectly elastic collisions involving an arbitrary number of particles,
the quantities m�u and m(�!1) should be conserved. While it seems plausible,

prima facie at least, to interpret these quantities as ‘relativistic momentum’ and
‘relativistic kinetic energy’ because they reduce to their Newtonian counterparts,
Einstein is pointing out that there may be other quantities that satisfy this
requirement. However, not all of these quantities will satisfy the conservation
principles which we take to be deﬁnitive of the corresponding concepts.� Thus,
having the appropriate Newtonian limit is only a necessary condition for such
an interpretation; it is clearly not suﬃcient. What justiﬁcation might count as
suﬃcient for Einstein will be made clear in Section 5 where I discuss the rest of
his paper.
Einstein’s second reason for saying that the purported demonstration is not
a proof reveals the core of what is at issue in demonstrations of E"mc�.
Einstein ﬁrst points out that ‘it is not perfectly clear what is meant in speaking of
the rest-energy, as the energy is deﬁned only a within an undetermined additive
constant’ (pp. 224—225). What is signiﬁcant here, which we know from Einstein’s
ﬁrst derivation, is that by rest-energy we do not mean this additive constant. In
both the Newtonian and relativistic case this additive constant is set to zero by
convention. Einstein’s point is that it is not clear what we do mean. Einstein
continues:
in connection with this, however, the following is to be remarked. Every system can
be looked upon as a material point as long as we consider no processes other than
changes in its translational velocity as a whole. It has clear meaning, however, to
consider changes in the rest-energy in case changes are to be considered other than
mere changes to the translational velocity (p. 225).

Einstein is pointing out that for any collection of particles (or more generally
any mass distribution) we can always consider the entire system as a material
point provided we are only considering changes in the translational velocity of
the system. We then simply treat the system as a material point, viz the centre of
mass of the system, which moves with a given velocity. However, there are cases
where it makes sense to speak of a change in the rest-energy of a particle. For
example, when a particle emits energy, say in the form of electromagnetic
radiation, but does not change its state of motion, then surely its rest-energy
has changed even though there have been no changes to its translational
velocity. In this case, interpreting the quantity m� as the energy of the particle
has the consequence that ‘in such a transformation of a material point its inertial
mass changes as the rest-energy; this assertion naturally requires a proof’
(p. 225).
At this stage, it is worthwhile to point out that Einstein is implicitly separating
three distinct claims associated with his famous equation which are sometimes
not clearly separated in philosophical discussions of spacetime theory. The ﬁrst
� Einstein naturally does not make the same demand of the concept of rest-mass—presumably
because he does not believe that its conservation, although it is a property of classical mass, is
deﬁnitive of the concept. Einstein seems to be assuming that the inertial mass of a body is deﬁned as
the ratio of force to acceleration.

claim, i.e. the assertion that, according to Einstein, ‘naturally requires a proof’
(p. 225), can be expressed as:
ME1. When there are no changes to a particle’s translational velocity,
a change in the rest-energy of the particle results in a proportional
change to its inertial mass, and conversely.
It is signiﬁcant that Einstein relates a change in the rest-energy of a particle to
a change in its inertial mass; what changes is the coeﬃcient that appears in the
expression for the kinetic energy and the momentum of the particle. Einstein
assumes that these coeﬃcients are the same and claims to later ﬁnd partial
justiﬁcation for this assumption. An important consequence of ME1 is that
when we combine masses by any method that releases energy, or when a particle
splits into two or more particles and releases energy, the classical law of
conservation of mass will no longer hold.�
Once we have secured the deﬁnition for the ‘new’ dynamical quantities, one
can, from these deﬁnitions alone, infer the second claim associated with the
equivalence of mass—energy:
ME2. If there is a change in the translational velocity u of the particle relative to
a given inertial frame, what we now call the relativistic mass of the
particle, and its relativistic energy, change.
One way to describe this, using the Minkowski formulation of SR, is to say that
observers will determine diﬀerent components for the four-momentum of
a given particle depending on their relative state of motion. Einstein distin
guishes ME2 from ME1 because he considers changes that aﬀect only the
translational velocity of the particle separately form ‘other changes’. In this
context, ME1 can be interpreted as saying that for a given observer, i.e. with
respect to the same inertial frame, during an inelastic collision between two
particles (i.e. when we allow changes not just of translational velocity but also to
the original masses and rest-energies of the particles) the change in the rest-mass
of a particle is equal to the change in rest-energy. Conversely, if a particle loses
energy through some physical process, the change in energy is equivalent to the
change in its rest-mass. This is not a claim about how diﬀerent observers
‘decompose’ a four-vector into diﬀerent spatial and temporal components. The
claim is that with respect to a single frame of reference, if the particle loses
energy, then the coeﬃcient of the kinetic energy (i.e. the particle’s inertial mass)
changes. Finally, as Mermin and Feigenbaum (1990) have pointed out, this is
diﬀerent from a third claim associated with the equivalence of mass—energy,

� Since one can deﬁne collisions quite generally to include these kinds of changes, one can say that
during inelastic collisions the inertial mass of a particle is no longer conserved in relativistic
dynamics.

usually stated as:
ME3. The rest-energy of a particle is equal to its rest-mass m (times the
�
speed of light squared).
ME3 states that when the velocity of a particle is zero with respect to some
inertial frame, the energy which must be attributed to this particle relative to
that frame is m c�. This attribution is entirely conventional because, as Einstein
�
points out, one can always choose the zero-point of the energy arbitrarily —
though some choices recommend themselves largely for computational sim
plicity.
In sum, Einstein’s concerns are as follows. First, we should not interpret m� as
the relativistic energy of a particle of mass m moving with velocity u until we
have shown that, theoretically at least, this is a quantity that is conserved in all
collisions. (Of course, it does not follow from this that this quantity will actually
be conserved when we perform experiments.) To adopt such an interpretation is
‘unjustiﬁed’ because we do not yet know that this quantity meets one of the
deﬁning characteristics of the concept of energy. Second, whatever the expres
sion for the rest-energy turns out to be, there are clear cases where it makes sense
to speak of the rest-energy of a particle changing, e.g. when a particle releases
energy (say in the form of electromagnetic radiation), but where there is no
change in its state of motion relative to some inertial frame. If we interpret m� as
the energy, this has the consequence that when the rest-energy changes, then the
particle’s rest-mass changes in the same way (and conversely). This is a new
physical result that requires a ‘proof’. One should be able, in other words, to
demonstrate that this result follows from the accepted physical principles and
deﬁnitions that lie at the core of the theory. It should not be a consequence of an
‘unjustiﬁed’ interpretation of a physical quantity.

4. Friedman and Mass–Energy Equivalence
Einstein has pointed out a signiﬁcant lacuna in derivations that proceed
merely by analogy. While these derivations may be of great heuristic value,
they often fail to separate the three distinct physical claims associated with
the equivalence of mass—energy and, in the context of philosophical discussions
of spacetime theory, sometimes fail to establish ME1. For example, Friedman’s
derivation of mass—energy equivalence, in his Foundations of Spacetime ¹heories
(1983, p. 142 ﬀ.), falls short of providing the kind of strong motivation for
the deﬁnitions of the ‘new’ dynamical quantities that Einstein’s (1935) derivation
provides. Furthermore, presumably because relativistic dynamics is not
his principal concern, Friedman stops short of proving the claim ME1, which is
the core of Einstein’s result. We can better appreciate the extent to which
Einstein’s concerns are still relevant by taking a closer look at Friedman’s
derivation.

Friedman begins by demonstrating the consequences to the laws of dynamics
of changing from Newtonian absolute time to the proper time of SR.� First, he
asks us to consider the law of motion for Newtonian dynamics, i.e. F"ma,
which he writes as:
m��� ��"F�,
�

(7)

where �� is the tangent vector ﬁeld to some curve �(t) parametrised by the
absolute time t and F� is a spacelike vector ﬁeld.� In Newtonian spacetime, this
implies that F� lies on the unique plane of simultaneity through a point p for
each p on �(t); t is any time function, i.e. for any displacement four-vector
��, t (��)"t where t is the magnitude of the projection of �� onto a time axis; m is
�
the Newtonian inertial mass of a particle. Friedman explains the requirement
that t (in equation (7)) must be a time function by providing the following result.
Let the curve �(t) be re-parametrised by an arbitrary parameter s. The require
ment that F� must be a spacelike vector, together with the requirement that the
temporal ‘metric’ t is compatible with the derivative operator, i.e. � t "0,
�
� �
imply that s is a ‘suitable parameter’ in the Newtonian law of motion if, and only
if, s is itself a time function, i.e. if s is a linear function of t.
Friedman then writes down the ‘corresponding law of motion for relativistic
dynamics’ (Friedman, 1983, p. 143):
m ��� ��"F�,
� �

(8)

where now �� is the tangent vector ﬁeld to a curve �(�) parametrised by the
proper time �, and m is the rest-mass of the particle, i.e. ‘the mass that would be
�
determined by an ideal measuring device co-moving with the particle’ (Fried
man, 1983, p. 143). Again, F� is a spacelike vector orthogonal to ��. Friedman
then notes that the ‘chief diﬀerence’ between equations (7) and (8) (which is
concealed in our notation) is that we have changed the scalar parametrising the
curve � from the absolute time t to the proper time �: ‘proper time has replaced
Newtonian absolute time’ (Friedman, 1983, p. 143).
In the Newtonian case, Friedman observes, the requirement that F� be
a spacelike vector implies that it lies on the unique plane of simultaneity through
some point p along the curve �(t). In the relativistic case, one cannot demand
this since there is, of course, no unique plane of simultaneity through p. There is,

� Throughout this discussion I assume that the reader is familiar with the modern way of presenting
spacetime theories using diﬀerential geometry on manifolds. I have also taken the liberty to translate
Friedman’s notation into standard abstract index notation. Also, I am assuming the standard
distinction between a curve, which is mapping �: I-�PM (where � is the set of real numbers, I is
an interval of �, and M is a manifold) and a path, which is the set of points which is the image of this
mapping on the manifold, i.e. �[I].
� The vector ﬁeld F� is spacelike because in the context of Newtonian spacetime the four-accelera
tion is always ‘orthogonal’ to the four-velocity. This is also the case of Minkowski spacetime. The
four-velocity is always timelike, so the four-acceleration must be spacelike.

however, a unique plane of simultaneity through p that is orthogonal to �. This
is the plane of simultaneity for the co-moving inertial reference frame at p. Thus,
in relativistic mechanics, one requires that � ��F�"0 (i.e. the four-velocity and
��
the four-force are orthogonal; since the four-velocity is always a timelike vector,
the four-force is always spacelike) and therefore,�
� ��(��� ��)"0.
��
�

(9)

Equation (9) together with the compatibility condition between metric and the
derivative operator, � � "0, again places a restriction on the arbitrary para
�� �
meter s that can be used in the relativistic law of motion, equation (8). Again,
Friedman shows that s must be linearly related to �.
This restriction on what the parameter s can be in the relativistic law of
motion ‘has important implications’ according to Friedman. In the Newtonian
context, the x -coordinate in an arbitrary inertial system is a suitable time
�
function t because it is always linearly related to the scalar that parametrises the
curve �. So in any inertial coordinate system, equation (7) becomes the familiar
expression of Newton’s second law:
m

d�x�
"F�.
dt�

(10)

Friedman then points out that this is not true in the relativistic case, because
the coordinate time t"x of an arbitrary inertial coordinate system is linearly
�
related to � just in case the curve �(�) in question has constant velocity [2]. So t is
a suitable parameter in (29) [our equation (8)] only if �(�) is a geodesic (and
therefore F"0) (Friedman, 1983, p. 144).

He then explains this in yet another way. For inertial motions, we can regard the
curve �, whose tangent vector ﬁeld is ��, as parametrised either by t or �.
Although Friedman does not say this explicitly, this is because if � is a timelike
geodesic, i.e. the trajectory of a particle moving inertially, then the geodesic
equation ��� ��"0 will continue to hold even if we reparametrise the curve by
any parameter s which is linearly related to �.� The parameter t satisﬁes this
condition only when the curve is a geodesic (and hence F�"0), so we can
interchange the parameters. For example, consider a particle that moves with
constant three-velocity u relative to some inertial frame F. Let its worldline be
the image of the curve � parametrised by the proper time �. The tangent ﬁeld to

� Recall from the deﬁnition of F� that �� � �� is a vector parallel to F�.
�
� One can prove the following general result. Let M be a manifold with a derivative operator � . Let
�
�: I-�PM be a smooth curve with tangent ﬁeld ��. Let �"� ° � be a reparametrization of �, i.e.
s"�(t) and � is a diﬀeomorphism �: IPI. Then � is a geodesic if and only if s is linear in �,
i.e. d�s/d��"0.

this curve satisﬁes the geodesic equation. Now let F� be another inertial frame in
‘standard conﬁguration’ which moves with constant velocity v relative to F. If
we parametrise the curve � by the x -coordinate t of the coordinate system
�
adapted to F�, then the tangent ﬁeld of this curve will also satisfy the geodesic
equation, since
d�
"�1!��
dt

(11)

d��
"0.
dt�

(12)

1
�" t#k,
�

(13)

implies

In other words,

where � is the Lorentz factor and k is an arbitrary constant. This is, of course, as
it should be; for it tells us that any two observers will agree that the trajectory
traced by an inertially moving particle is a geodesic path of Minkowski spacetime regardless of how they parametrise the curve.
For non-inertial motions, t and � are not interchangeable because when the
curve is not a geodesic, t is no longer linearly related to �. In other words, when
we are considering the motion of particles subject to a force (i.e. particles that
follow non-inertial paths for which F�O0), we cannot simply interchange the
parameters t and �. In this case, how � is related to t will change from ‘instant to
instant’ as one ‘moves along the curve’. Again, physically this makes sense
because it implies that any two observers will always agree that the path of
a body moving non-inertially is not a geodesic. However, they will disagree on
the magnitude of the particle’s four-acceleration unless they agree to parametrise
the curve by the proper time �. This is because when ��� ��"0, the magnitude
�
of this vector (at same point p on the image of the curve) will change depending
on the parameter (see, for example, Schutz, 1985, p. 129). So in order to have
a well-deﬁned notion of four-force, one must always parametrise the curve by
proper time. Thus, we arrive, with Friedman, at the following result. ¼hen
considering non-inertial motion, the worldlines of particles must always be par
ametrised by their proper time.
Friedman’s derivation of mass—energy equivalence begins with the observa
tion that not being able to interchange the parameters t and � in the equation of
motion (8) ‘is responsible for the characteristic diﬀerences between relativistic
dynamics and Newtonian dynamics’ (p. 145). He then proceeds to introduce the
deﬁnitions for the ‘new’ dynamical quantities. First, he notes that in an inertial
coordinate system, equation (8) becomes:
m

d�x�
"F�.
� d��

(14)

Using the deﬁnition of the four-velocity (what Friedman calls the ‘proper
velocity’), ��"dx�/d�, one can re-write this equation as,
d
(m ��)"F�.
(15)
d� �
From this equation (15), Friedman concludes that the four-vector p�"m �� is
�
‘therefore the relativistic counterpart of the classical momentum’. Now consider
a particle that moves with a ‘coordinate three-velocity’ u"(u , u , u ) relative to
� � �
some inertial frame F. The particle’s four-velocity �� has components �� in this
inertial frame which are given by:
(��)"�(u) (1, u , u , u ).
� � �
The components of the four-momentum in this inertial frame are:

(16)

(p�)"m �(u)(1, u , u , u ).
(17)
�
� � �
Friedman now asserts that the quantity p"m �(u)u is the relativistic three�
momentum, which has magnitude p"m �(u)u. He then deﬁnes the ‘relativistic
�
mass’ of the particle by the relation m"p/u and thus arrives at the expression
m"m �(u) which is ‘the traditional formula for the dependence of mass on
�
velocity’ (p. 145).
Friedman now uses the following equation to deﬁne the relativistic energy of
the particle:
dE
dp
"u ,
dt
dt

(18)

where p is the magnitude of the relativistic momentum. There are two important
things to notice about this deﬁnition. First, the parameter with respect to which
we are diﬀerentiating is the coordinate time t and not the proper time �. In eﬀect,
this equation deﬁnes the relativistic energy of a particle relative to an inertial
frame whose x -coordinate is t. Second, this deﬁnition is, again, motivated by
�
the ‘corresponding’ deﬁnition from the Newtonian case. If we simply replace
p by the magnitude of the classical momentum, then this equation can be used to
deﬁne the classical energy of a particle relative to an inertial frame, viz solving
(18) with p"mu yields
E"� mu�#k,
(19)
�
where k is a constant of integration. In the relativistic case, i.e. when we take
p"m �(u)u, we ﬁnd
�
E"m �(u)#k,
(20)
�
where k, again, is a constant of integration. Friedman then points out that it is
usual practice to set E "0 and ‘to deﬁne the relativistic energy’ by
�
E"m �(u)"m
(with c"1).
(21)
�

He then claims that this is ‘the traditional relation between relativistic
energy and relativistic mass’. Finally, he points out that if we compare equation
(21) with equation (17), we ‘see’ that the four-momentum has components
(E, p) where E is the relativistic energy and p is the relativistic three-momen
tum: ‘This is why p� [i.e. the four-momentum] is called the energy—momentum
vector.’
This demonstration of mass—energy equivalence is not nearly as cavalier
as the one Einstein considers in the opening of his (1935) paper, though it
still fails in similar respects. Friedman has clearly shown how the change in
the structure of spacetime leads to equations like (15) which suggest what the
relativistic ‘counterparts’ of the classical dynamical quantities ought to be. In
eﬀect, Friedman has shown that if we assume, for example, that m� can correctly
be interpreted as the relativistic energy of a particle, then we can oﬀer some
justiﬁcation for this interpretation. We can show how this quantity arises as
the ‘relativistic counterpart’ of the familiar Newtonian quantity when the
structure of spacetime changes. Still, Friedman has not shown the extent
to which we are committed to these interpretations if we accept the phys
ical principles that lie at the core of SR. Since Friedman relies on analogies
to introduce the new relativistic quantities, Einstein’s criticisms are still
pressing.
First, as I indicated in Section 3, Einstein is concerned that the quantities we
routinely deﬁne as the relativistic momentum and relativistic energy may not
satisfy the conservation conditions that we take to be deﬁnitive characteristics of
these quantities. Friedman has not given any sort of argument to support the
claim that the quantities that he deﬁnes satisfy this requirement. To illustrate
this, consider two particles of equal rest-mass m travelling in opposite direc
�
tions with equal speeds with respect to some inertial frame F. Suppose the
particles experience a perfectly inelastic collision forming a doublet at rest at the
origin of the coordinate system adapted to F. From what Friedman has
demonstrated we can determine, given the relative state of motion of an
observer, the value for the mass of each particle before the collision for this
observer. Now suppose we ask the following question: what is the mass of the
resulting doublet? To answer this question, Friedman must use (1) the quantity
m �, which he interprets as the energy of each particle, and (2) the principle of
�
conservation of energy. Einstein’s objection is that Friedman cannot apply the
principle of conservation of energy to the quantity m � unless we have good
�
reason to suppose that this quantity should be interpreted as the relativistic
energy of the particle. But if all we have is an analogical argument, which is in
the end all that Friedman oﬀers when he deﬁnes the relativistic energy, we
cannot accept this interpretation since we have no reason to suppose that this
quantity will be conserved in all collisions. This is not circular. What Einstein is
saying is that we must know that for all collisions the quantity m � is conserved
�
before we say that it is so conserved for this collision.
Second, Einstein (1935) criticises the purported demonstration he analyses
because it does not oﬀer a proof of ME1. Friedman’s demonstration also fails to

provide an argument to support this claim. This, it seems to me, is a result of
being concerned primarily with changes to the dynamical quantities that arise as
a result of changes to the velocity of a particle. In other words, Friedman does
not consider the ‘other changes’, which are not merely changes to the transla
tional velocities of particles, that give rise to ME1. As a result, Friedman’s
demonstration does not clearly show the important diﬀerence between the
classical concept of inertial mass and the relativistic concept of rest-mass. As
Torretti (1990, pp. 58—68) has pointed out, the key diﬀerence between these two
concepts is best understood by looking at their associated structure. For
Torretti, this means, roughly, that while the classical concept of inertial mass can
be understood as an extensive magnitude that behaves like an element of the
additive semi-group of the real numbers, the relativistic rest-mass does not. This
is because while instances of the classical concept of mass combine in a way that
can be modelled by the addition of real numbers, the rest-mass of relativistic
mechanics does not. As Mermin and Feigenbaum explain, ‘if a particle in its rest
frame decays into a collection of particles with a total kinetic energy K, then the
total mass of the ﬁnal group of particles must be less than the initial mass by
K/c�, (1990, p. 270).
In sum, Friedman oﬀers some justiﬁcation for the introduction of the ‘new’
relativistic dynamic quantities when he considers how changes to the structure
of spacetime aﬀect the classical deﬁnitions. Thus, he has given some justiﬁcation
for ME2 and, implicitly at least, he has shown that ME3 is not really the
signiﬁcant aspect of the equivalence of mass and energy because one can always
change the zero-point of the energy scale. However, Friedman seems to assume
the interpretation of the quantities m�, m�u, m(�!1). He has not clearly shown
the extent to which we are committed to the interpretations of the quantities he
deﬁnes as relativistic momentum and kinetic energy. For example, given Fried
man’s presentation, if experiments revealed that the quantity he deﬁnes as the
relativistic energy was not conserved, one seems free to postulate another
deﬁnition of relativistic energy as long as one does not use Newtonian absolute
time in the deﬁnition. Of course, this would be suspect methodology and one not
likely to withstand critical scrutiny. My point is just that Friedman’s discussion
does not give us a clear sense of all the physical principles and postulates of SR
that would be at stake if the equivalence of mass—energy were not empirically
corroborated. Finally, as I have argued above, Friedman does not oﬀer a proof
of ME1, which is really the signiﬁcant result associated with Einstein’s famous
equation.

5. Einstein’s 1935 Dynamical Derivation of E�mc2
Einstein’s (1935) derivation of mass—energy equivalence oﬀers stronger
motivations for interpreting the quantities m�, m�u, and m(�!1) as the
relativistic energy, momentum, and kinetic energy, respectively, than we have
seen in Friedman’s derivation. Einstein’s explicit aim in this paper is to

show that:
If the principles of conservation of impulse and energy are to hold for all coordi
nate systems which are connected with one another by the Lorentz transforma
tions, then impulse and energy are really given by the above expressions and the
presumed equivalence of mass and rest-energy also exists (p. 225).

The antecedent of the conditional deserves some comment. Einstein assumes the
principle of conservation of momentum and the principle of conservation of
energy along with the two postulates of SR (which lead to the Lorentz trans
formations). What is noteworthy is that although Einstein assumes these conser
vation principles and the kinematical framework of SR, he does not assume the
exact mathematical expressions that deﬁne the ‘new’ dynamical quantities but
only assumes their general ‘form’. Einstein does not assume, in other words, that,
for example, m� should be interpreted as the relativistic energy of a particle of
mass m. Instead, he assumes two general physical principles, which we have no
reason to suppose no longer hold despite the change in the structure of
spacetime, and other ‘reasonable’ assumptions, like the fact that the energy of
a particle should be a monotonically increasing function of the speed of the
particle (assuming that space is isotropic). He then shows how these theoretical
constraints, combined with the methodological constraint that the relativistic
quantities should reduce to their Newtonian counterparts in the appropriate
limit, single out the expressions for the ‘new’ dynamical quantities. He does this
by showing that the only quantities that are conserved during a perfectly elastic
collision between two particles are m�u and m (�!1). Thus, while Einstein has
not done the impossible—he has not shown that given the deﬁnitions of
relativistic momentum and relativistic kinetic energy one can prove that these
quantities are conserved without appealing to a conservation principle—he
has given far stronger motivations for the interpretations of these quantities
than one ﬁnds in derivations that proceed by analogy. In this way, Einstein
establishes ME2 and ME3. He then proves ME1 by analysing an inelastic
collision. Since Einstein’s (1935) derivation is not well known to philosophers,
I proceed through the derivation in some detail, picking up where we left oﬀ in
Section 2.
Einstein assumes that the relativistic momentum and relativistic energy for
a particle of mass m have the following form:
p "mu F(u), �"1, 2, 3 and E"E #mG(u),
(22)
�
�
�
where E is the rest-energy of the particle and p are the components of the
�
�
relativistic momentum in some inertial coordinate system S, and F and G are
arbitrary (continuous) functions to be determined. The expression for the rela
tivistic kinetic energy then has the form:
KE "mG(u).
(23)

These expressions for the relativistic momentum and relativistic kinetic energy
are suggestive, prima facie, because according to Taylor’s theorem, they have the

potential to reduce to their Newtonian counterparts in the appropriate limit.�
The requirement that these deﬁnitions actually reduce to their Newtonian
counterparts—a methodological constraint—imposes additional constraints on
the functions F and G. For example, using the Taylor expansion for F yields the
following expression for the relativistic momentum:
p "mu[(F(0)#F�(0)u#�F��(0)u�#O(u�)].

�

(24)

This expression will reduce to its corresponding Newtonian counterpart if terms
of the second order in u and higher are neglected and if F(0)"1 and F�(0)"0.
Similarly, the expression for KE will reduce to its Newtonian counterpart if

G(0)"0, G�(0)"0, G��(0)"1, and if terms of the third order and higher in u are
neglected.
Einstein further assumes that the ‘impulse and energy of the mass point are
independent of the direction of motion and of the orientation of the mass-point
relative to the velocity’ (p. 227). Thus, the functions F(u) and G(u) can be treated
as functions of the speed of the particle, as I have written them. This assumption
is warranted by our belief in the isotropy of space. Einstein also assumes that the
F(u) and G(u) are ‘universal, even functions of the velocity u, which vanish for
u"0’ (p. 226).�� Finally, Einstein implicitly assumes that the functions F and
G are monotonic bijections. This ensures that for every velocity there is a distinct
value for the momentum (or kinetic energy) and that as the velocity increases,
the momentum (or kinetic energy) also increases, i.e. we never ﬁnd a lower value
of the momentum (or kinetic energy) for a higher value of the velocity.
Given that one cannot prove the conservation principles by assuming only
the deﬁnitions of the new dynamical quantities, Einstein sets out to prove the
converse: if the conservation principles hold, regardless of the exact mathemat
ical expressions of these quantities, then the deﬁnitions of relativistic momentum
and relativistic kinetic energy must be those given by equations (4) and (5).
Einstein’s goal is to determine the exact mathematical expressions for the
functions F(u) and G(u) from the assumptions I have outlined above. What is
distinctive about this approach is that Einstein is using the ‘principles’ of SR
(including the conservation principles) to determine what the expressions for the
‘new’ relativistic dynamical quantities must be.
To ﬁnd the expressions for the functions F(u) and G(u), Einstein analyses an
elastic, eccentric collision. He begins by considering a pair of particles of equal
(inertial) mass m that travel with equal and opposite velocities toward each other
when referred to a coordinate system S’ (Einstein refers to such a pair of
particles as a particle pair); their velocities are parallel (though of course
� Assuming, of course, F(u) and G(u) are continuous and have continuous derivatives.
�� Since we are assuming that these are functions of the speed, we can take them as being deﬁned on
[0,R) instead of treating them as even functions of the velocity. Also, the requirement that both
functions vanish for u"0 is not, strictly speaking, correct. As I have shown above, for the function
F the requirement is that F(0)"1 though, of course, p(0)"0.

opposite in sign) but not collinear (since the collision is eccentric). To keep track
of the particles, Einstein uses ‘#’ and ‘!’ signs. So, for example, we have
u� "!u� . Einstein then asks: with respect to S�, what are the velocities of the
�
�
particles after the collision?
If the velocities after the collision were not likewise equal and opposite, the impulse
law would be violated. If the common velocity of both masses after the collision
were not equal in magnitude to that before the collision, in case the collision is
elastic, the energy law would be violated. ¹his holds independently of the particular
law of dependence of impulse and energy on the velocity (1935, p. 227, emphasis
added).

Let me separate the two claims contained in this answer. The ﬁrst is that if the
principle of conservation of momentum holds, then the velocities of both
particles after the collision will also be equal and opposite, i.e. u� "u� , where
�
�
the barred quantities indicate value after the collision. Einstein’s claim is that
this is true quite independently of what the exact mathematical expression for
the function F(u) in the deﬁnition of the relativistic momentum turns out to be.
Although Einstein does not provide an argument to support this claim, one can
show that this is indeed the case. We begin with the law of conservation of
momentum:
� p "� p .
�
���

(25)

For the particle pair in Einstein’s thought experiment we know that, since
u "!u before the collision, we have:
�
�
� p "mu F(u )#m u F(u )"0.
�
�
�
�
�

(26)

Therefore, by the law of conservation of momentum,
� p "mu F(u )#mu F(u )"0.
���
�� ��
�� ��

(27)

What we want to prove is that if u Ou, then �p O0. We show the con
�
���
trapositive. From (27) we have:
u F(u )#u F(u )"0,
�
�
�
�

(28)

u F(u )"!u F(u ),
�
�
�
�

(29)

u F(u )"u F(u ),
�
�
�
�

(30)

that is,
or

(taking the magnitude of both sides). Thus
u
F(u )
� �" � � .
u
F(u )
��
��

(31)

Equation (31) is satisﬁed if and only if u "u , since F is a monotonically
�
�
increasing function.�� Therefore, if the conservation of momentum holds, re
gardless of the exact expression for the momentum, u "u , i.e. the speeds of
�
�
the particles are equal after the collision.
Einstein’s second claim in the quotation is that if the common speed of both
particles u"u "u after the collision is not equal to their common speed
�
�
u before the collision, i.e. if uOu, in the case when the collision is elastic, then the
conservation of energy would be violated. Again, one easily shows the con
trapositive. First, recall that the energy of a particle is given by E"E #mG(u).
�
In the case of an elastic collision, the rest-mass and rest-energy of each particle
before and after the collision remain the same. Therefore, energy conservation
entails that for the particle pair consisting of two particles of mass m moving the
common speed u in opposite directions, we have:
thus

2E #2mG(u)"2E #2mG(u),
�
�

(32)

G(u)"G(u).

(33)

Again, since we assume G is a monotonically increasing function, equation (33)
can only be satisﬁed if u"u. Therefore, if energy conservation is satisﬁed,
independently of the exact mathematical expression for the relativistic kinetic
energy, the common speed of the particle pair before the collision is equal to the
common speed of the particle pair after the collision. Putting these two results
together leads to the conclusion that if two particles form a particle pair before
a collision, they will also be a particle pair after the collision. The only diﬀerence
is that the direction of their velocities will be diﬀerent.
At this stage, Einstein has already derived the following equations for the
components of the velocities of a particle pair from the Lorentz transformations:
�(u )#�(u )"2�(u�)�(�),
�
�

(34)

u �(u )#u �(u )"2� �(u�)�(�),
�� �
�� �

(35)

u �(u )#u �(u )"0,
�� �
�� �

(36)

u �(u )#u �(u )"0.
�� �
�� �

(37)

In these equations, the unprimed quantities are those measured in a coordinate
system S which moves with velocity � relative to S�. Now since the particle pair is

�� To see this, one considers three cases. Case I: u 'u and thus F(u )'F(u ), since F is
��
� �(31) cannot hold
� � since u� � /u '1 but
monotonically increasing. However, in this case, equation
�� ��
F(u )/F(u )(1.
�
�
�
�
Case II: u (u and thus F(u )(F(u ), since F is monotonically increasing. Again, in this case,
�
� � cannot
��
� � but F(u )/F(u )'1.
equation (31)
hold since� u /u (1
� ��
�
� � (31)� �satisﬁed.
Case III: u "u and F(u )"F(u ), and equation
��
��
��
��

turned into another particle pair with speed u� relative to S� after the collision,
the right-hand side of equations (34)—(37) does not change after the collision. The
left-hand side changes because all the velocities must be replaced by the ‘barred’
velocities. So we get another four equations like (34)—(37). After a little bit of
algebra, one arrives at the following equations, which Einstein refers to as
‘conservation equations’ (1935, p. 227):
(38)
�(u )#�(u )"�(u )#�(u ),
�
�
��
��
(39)
u �(u )#u �(u )"u �(u )#u �(u ).
�� � �
�� �
�� � �
� �� � �
How do these equations help us ﬁnd the functions F(u) and G(u)? Einstein says,
with characteristic brevity:
These equations, which are valid in general for elastic collisions of equal masses,
have the form of conservation equations; it may therefore be taken for granted that
no other symmetrical or anti-symmetrical functions of the velocity-components
exist which in the present case of the elastic collision of two identically constituted
material points give anything analogous (1935, p. 227).

Einstein is boldly stating that these conservation equations are unique. To
understand this claim, recall how he arrives at these conservation equations.
Einstein uses only the Lorentz transformations (and a little algebra) to arrive at
equations (34)—(37). And since we are assuming that the Lorentz transformations
are unique, i.e. they are the only allowable transformations between two inertial
coordinate systems, equations (34)—(37) are also unique (these are the only
transformation equations for the velocities of the particle pair). From the
analysis of the elastic collision, we arrive at the result a particle pair before the
collision is converted into another particle pair after the collision. The only thing
that changes is the direction of the velocities. This, together with equations
(34)—(37) when written for quantities before and after the collision, yields the
conservation equations. But since equations (34)—(37) are unique, so are the
conservation equations. In other words, there are only two ways in which we
could obtain a diﬀerent set of conservation equations. First, the equations would
be diﬀerent if the result of the thought experiment regarding the common speed
of the particles were diﬀerent. But this would only be the case if, as we have seen,
the principle of conservation of energy or the principle of conservation of
momentum were violated. Second, the equations would be diﬀerent if equations
(34)—(37) were diﬀerent. But equations (34)—(37) would be diﬀerent only if we
accepted a set of transformation equations between inertial frames that was not
the Lorentz transformations. Hence, equations (38) and (39) are the only equa
tions of this type that obtain between the components of the velocities involved.
Thus, given our assumptions about the uniqueness of the Lorentz transforma
tions and the applicability of the conservation principles in analysing the
collision, the conservation equations (38) and (39) are unique.��
�� Strictly speaking, these equations are unique only up to an additive constant.

Einstein now states his conclusion about the functions F(u) and G(u). He tells
us, directly after the passage I have quoted above, that ‘consequently we shall
have to regard’ the relativistic momentum and kinetic energy as given by the
expressions:
p "mu�(u), and KE "m(�(u)!1).


Thus, the conservation equations suggest that:

(40)

F(u)"�(u), and

(41)

G(u)"�(u)!1.

This last inference also requires some explanation. Since the collision we are
considering is elastic, it follows that the masses of the particles, with respect to
the inertial coordinate system S, before and after the collision, are the same.
Consequently, we can write:
m� #m� "m� #m� ,
(42)
�
�
�
�
mu � #mu � "mu � #mu � ,
(43)
�� �
�� �
�� �
�� �
where � "�(u
:
) and so on. Looking back at the general mathematical form of
�
�
the expressions for relativistic momentum and relativistic kinetic energy of
equations (22) and (23), equations (42) and (43) ‘suggest’ that we take F(u)"�(u)
and G(u)"�(u). The disparity between this conclusion and Einstein’s is re
moved, perhaps not surprisingly, by appeal to the Newtonian limit. Quite
simply, if we had taken G(u)"�(u), then the expression for the relativistic kinetic
energy would not reduce to its classical counterpart in the Newtonian limit since
there would be an extra additive constant m. Alternatively, we could note, as
Einstein does, that taking G(u)"�(u) does not satisfy the requirement that the
kinetic energy vanish when the velocity is zero while G(u)"�(u)!1 does. The
latter expression will, of course, also be conserved in equation (42).
Once Einstein motivates the deﬁnitions for the relativistic momentum and
kinetic energy, the derivation of mass—energy equivalence, ME1, is straightfor
ward. Einstein now considers an inelastic collision and appeals to the principle
of conservation of energy to arrive at the desired result. Consider again a particle
pair consisting of two particles with equal rest-energies E that move with equal
�
and opposite velocities with respect to S�. Einstein assumes that whatever
internal changes the particles suﬀer as a result of the collision are equal to each
other. Since the collision is inelastic, both E and m can change as a result of the
�
collision. As we have seen, the conservation of momentum implies that the
velocities of the particles after the collision must be equal and opposite. Assum
ing that the conservation of energy holds both in the inertial frame S� and in
another frame S related to it by a Lorentz transformation, one can write down
two conservation equations:
2E #2m(��!1)"2E #2m(��!1),
�
��
2E #m(� !1)#m(� !1)"2E #m(� !1)#m(� !1).
�
�
�
� �
� �
��

(44)
(45)

Using equation (34) one can rewrite these equations and subtract one from the
other to obtain:
E !E "m!m.
(46)
�
�
��
From this equation, Einstein concludes: ‘The rest-energy changes, therefore, in
an inelastic collision (additively) like the mass’ (1935, p. 229). Einstein adds that
since the rest-energy is determined only up to an additive constant, ‘one can
stipulate that E should vanish together with m’ (1935, p. 229). If the rest-energy
�
vanishes with m, which is clearly only a hypothesis here (and in all derivations of
mass—energy equivalence in SR), then it follows that E "m, ‘which states the
�
principle of the equivalence of mass and rest-energy’ (1935, p. 229). Thus,
Einstein proves ME1.
In this way, Einstein’s concern, that if we simply deﬁne the relativistic
momentum and kinetic energy as in equation (40) the conservation laws might
not hold, is quelled by showing that if the conservation laws hold, these
expressions are uniquely singled out from a range of possible options. We call
the quantities deﬁned by these equations ‘relativistic momentum’ and ‘relativis
tic kinetic energy’ not only because they reduce to their classical counterparts
but because they obey the same conservation principles—relativistic mo
mentum and relativistic kinetic energy are conserved in elastic collisions. Thus,
Einstein has shown that subject to a collection of physical assumptions, the
mathematical expressions for these particular physical quantities are uniquely
determined. From these deﬁnitions we get ME2; Einstein then gives a proof
of ME1.
6. Conclusion
Einstein’s (1935) derivation of mass—energy equivalence is philosophically
signiﬁcant, because it shows that adopting the traditional deﬁnitions for the
‘new’ relativistic dynamical quantities is motivated not merely by analogy but by
something far deeper, viz the physical principles that lie at the core of the theory.
Thus, Einstein’s (1935) derivation, and other derivations of this kind, show that
much more than an arbitrary deﬁnition or analogy is at stake as we wait for the
experimental data to verify these results. If, contrary to fact, the equivalence of
mass—energy were not empirically corroborated, all the physical principles that
motivated the deﬁnitions in the ﬁrst place would be impugned. Finally, Ein
stein’s (1935) derivation, and others that proceed along these lines, enable us to
separate three distinct physical consequences of the equivalence of mass—energy
that are not always clearly separated and to see what aspects of the deﬁnitions of
the new dynamical quantities are conventional.
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